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The Effects of Self-Esteem

Abstract
The present study examined the psychological processes underlying
the self-serving bjas, the tendency to portray one's own qualities as
more favorable then those of others. Subjects were asked to predict
future success on a behavioral task for themselves and for the average
student at their university after receiving performance feedback on the
same task. It was proposed that self-enhancing predictions would be
moderated by subject's self-esteem (high or low), the verifiability of
task performance (high or low), and performance feedback (success or
failure). The results revealed that subjects with high self-esteem
displayed a self-serving bias regardless of performance verifiability or
feedback. Subjects with low self-esteem, however, self-enhanced only
for tasks low in verifiabBity and showed a slight self-enhancing trend
when receiving success feedback. The results are discussed in terms of
depressive realism, verifiability theory, and self-consistency theory.
Implications for teaching positive cognitive strategies to low
self-esteem individuals are discussed.
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The Effects of Self-Esteem, Performance Feedback,
and Behavioral Verifiability on Self-Serving Biases
Until recently, individuals with low self-esteem were thought to
possess a distorted view of themselves and their social world.
Depressives were theorized to be motivated to heighten their
self-image by derogating others and distorting or enhancing their
self-perception (Jones, 1973; Wills, 1981 ). Alternatively, they were
believed to be more likely to downgrade themselves (Beck, 1967) and
overestimate other's abilities (Martin, Abramson & Alloy, 1984). In a
dramatic departure from these ideas, current research suggests that
depressed or low self-esteem individuals are more accurate or
realistic than those with average or high self-esteem. Studies now
show that depressed individuals are more accurate in recognizing
personal level of social skills (Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton,
1980), absolute versus relative improvement in test scores (Campbell,
Fairey, & Fehr, 1986), true differences between self and other's test
scores (Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & lngerman, 1987), and predicting
future success (Alloy, 1987).
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The Self-Serving Bias and Qepressjye Realism
The self-serving bias and depressive realism have been proposed to
explain information processing tendencies displayed by individuals
with high and low self-esteem. Research indicates that people with
average or high self-esteem display self-enhancing illusions, and that
people with low self-esteem may actually hold veridical perceptions of
themselves and their social surroundings. In addressing
self-perceptions of social competency, Lewinsohn et al. (1980) asked
normal, psychiatric-nondepressed, and depressed subjects to assess
their social skills following their participation in an observed 20
minute social group function. As rated by blind coders, the depressed
individuals were obviously more deficient in their skills than the
normal controls. However, when comparing the subjects' ratings with
those of the coders, the depressed individuals assessed their lack of
skills accurately while the nondepressed subjects (normal and
psychiatric) over-rated their abilities. This ability to recognize the
truth, although negative, by individuals with low self-esteem is
referred to as depressive realism.
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In another study, Alloy and Ahrens (1987) asked depressed and
nondepressed college students to make predictions regarding their own
and their classmates' futures. They found that while depressed
subjects were more pessimistic than nondepressed subjects in
predicting their own futures, the depressed were equally as
pessimistic about everyone else's future. This global pessimistic
theme, as well as lowered self-esteem, is considered one of the key
traits of depression (Beck, 1967). Nondepressed students, on the other
hand, showed evidence of a self-serving bias in that their forecasts
were more positive for themselves than for others.
Further evidence for depressive realism was obtained by Crocker et
al. (1987), who manipulated test feedback (success or failure) to high,
medium, and low self-esteem subjects. When asked to rate themselves
and other subjects on a number of traits, subjects in the high
self-esteem group receiving failure feedback tended to derogate the
other subjects. Apparently, when high self-esteem individuals are
faced with ego threatening information, the self-serving bias kicks in
to restore the self-perception, allowing individuals to maintain their
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healthy level of self-esteem. This perspective suggests that
self-enhancement may be motivated by perceived attacks on the self
(Brown, Collins, & Schmidt, 1988). Moreover, it suggests that people
arrange their social environments so as to be consistent with their
self-views. The role of self-consistency motivation in the
maintenance of one's present level of self-esteem is discussed next.
Self-Consistency Theory
Self-consistency refers to the notion that people attempt to control
and predict their world by behaving in ways that perpetuate and
confirm their self-perceptions (Swann, 1987; Swann, Griffin,
Predmore, & Gains, 1987). From this perspective, people utilize at
least two strategies to sustain their self-beliefs. First, they can
create social environments that foster the survival of their self-view.
They can do this by strategically choosing partners and social settings
(Swann & Pelham, 1987), displaying identity cues (Schlenker, 1980), or
utilizing interaction strategies (Swann & Read, 1981 ). The second way
that people sustain their self-beliefs is to see more self-confirmatory
evidence than actually exists. They do this by selectively attending to
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(Swann & Read, 1981 ), retrieving (Crary, 1966), and interpreting
(Markus, 1977) information that is consistent with their self-concept.
In a test of self-consistency theory, Swann et al. (1987) had
subjects who were either high or low in self-esteem deliver a
pre-written speech. Subjects were then given feedback in terms of
their social abilities (high or low/self-confidence, comfort around
others, and social competence) as rated by an observer. Following the
feedback session, subjects were asked to rate the accuracy and
competence of the observer. The results supported the consistency
model in that subjects receiving feedback that confirmed their
self-esteem (high self-esteem/high social abilities or low
self-esteem/low social abilities) rated the observers as more accurate
and competent. Other studies demonstrating self-enhancement for high
self-esteem but not for low self-esteem individuals can also be
further understood in terms of the self-consistency model.
A novel study by Campbell et al. (1986) compared the attention
placed on relative or absolute information as a function of self-esteem.
These researchers gave high and low self-esteem subjects feedback as
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to how they and a friend performed on two tests. In one condition, the
subjects' results were not very good, although they were better than
their friends' performance. This was the relative condition; compared
to the friend the subject did relatively well. In the absolute condition,
the subjects' test results were better than in the relative condition but
lower than their friends' absolute condition test results. Thus,
although the subject did poorer than the friend on the second test, the
results were an improvement over the first test. When asked to rate
their success, subjects with high self-esteem stated they had done
better in the relative condition, supporting the need for
self-enhancement through social comparison. The low self-esteem
group, however, reported greater success in the absolute condition, a
judgment based on objective fact rather than a self-serving strategy.
In support of the self-consistency theory, it may be that because low
self-esteem individuals do not expect to do well and those with high
self-esteem do, each individual attended to the information that best
verified their self-perception.
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Although depressive realism theory and self-consistency theory
have both received considerable empirical support, we should note that
an interesting discrepancy exists with regard to how the two theories
propose that low self-esteem individuals perceive their worlds. The
self-consistency model states that both low and high self-esteem
individuals modify and distort reality in order to maintain a view that
is consistent with their self-image. Depressive realism, on the other
hand, states that low self-esteem people are realistic in their
perceptions and that high self-esteem individuals are the ones who
distort reality in a self-serving direction. Resolving this theoretical
discrepancy is one of the goals of the present research.
Verifiability Theory
A third relevant theoretical position that proposes conditions under
which self-serving biases are most likely to emerge is behavioral
verifiability theory. From this perspective, actions that are high in
verifiability are less susceptible to self-serving biases. To illustrate,
intelligence and athletic ability are verifiable because one can take a
test or play a game and objectively determine one's level of ability.
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Social or moral behaviors, however, are not as verifiable because there
are no clear, objective measures as to higher or lower social or moral
behaviors (as an IQ score for intelligence). As a result of this
differential verifiability, people should be more likely to exaggerate
their moral qualities than their intellectual ones.
Support for this model has been provided in both a social (Brown et
al., 1988) and cognitive dimension (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989;
Van Lange, 1990). Brown et al. argue that everyone is in need of
self-enhancement. Due to the need for self-consistency, however, high
and low self-esteem individuals pursue this goal differently. To
illustrate this idea, Brown et al. conducted a study in which subjects
were divided into groups and then the groups were divided once again.
They were therefore direct members of this last group but vicarious
members of the group formed by the first split. Each group was to
complete a creativity task and then to rate the results produced by
each group. In support of the verifiability model, high self-esteem
subjects showed favoritism for the group in which they were directly
involved. This self-serving bias of a highly verifiable nature (they
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~group

members) in no way threatened their positive self-view;

rather, it maintained consistency. Subjects with low self-esteem,
however, showed favoritism for the group in which they were vicarious
members (low verifiability); therefore, the success was not directly
attributable to them. This form of indirect self-enhancement also
maintains consistency. The low self-esteem individuals were not
taking personal credit for the success, thereby not threatening their
low self-concept.
This same distinction is made when subjects are asked to compare
themselves and others on behaviors reflecting intelligence or morality.
Verifiability theory would predict larger self-enhancing biases for
morality, a nonverifiable quality, than for intelligence, a verifiable one.
To test this idea, Allison et al. (1989) had subjects ascribe the
probability of performing different moral and intelligent acts for
themselves and others. As expected, a greater self-serving bias was
found for those behaviors that were not verifiable. That is, subjects
rated themselves as more likely to perform moral acts than others but
no more likely to perform intelligent acts. Allison et al. proposed that
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the self-serving bias is limited by the "publicity, specificity and
objectivity of the dimensions on which these beliefs are held" (p. 275).
In a similar study, Van Lange (1990) had subjects write 2 stories,
one about how an example of their behavior has affected another, and
the other about how someone else's behavior has affected them.
Subjects then rated the 2 stories for moral and intelligent content.
Consistent with Allison et al.'s (1989) findings, subjects showed a
self-serving bias by rating their behavior as better than the other
person's, and this was especially true for the moral dimension. Van
Lang and Allison et al. explain this effect as illustrating people's need
to maintain positive rather than negative self-views. This
self-serving belief, however, must be truthful to be believable.
Truthful in this sense may refer to not being able to be proven false,
and is thus limited to a nonverifiable quality such as morality.
The Present Study
In attempting to identify the process by which self-serving biases
are moderated by levels of self-esteem, researchers have overlooked an
important issue. As mentioned above, predictions generated from the
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depressive realism perspective differ from those based on
self-consistency theory. Specifically, these two theoretical positions
differ in their view of how depressives an non-depressives perceive
and interpret positive and negative events. If self-consistency is
operating, then depressives should renounce their successes while
non-depressives should acknowledge theirs. But if depressive realism
is operating, then depressives should acknowledge their successes
whereas non-depressives should exaggerate theirs.
Not only should successful or unsuccessful outcomes affect
self-serving tendencies, but the verifiability of those outcomes should
also play a central role. The present study assumes, along with Allison
et al. (1989), that moral aptitude is less verifiable than intellectual
aptitude. Half of the subjects were classified as having high
self'."esteem, whereas the other half were classified as having low
self-esteem. Moreover, half the subjects were given an intelligence
test while the other half were tested on-their moral qualities.
Subjects were given either success or-failure feedback about their
performances and then asked to predict future success or failure on the
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same test for themselves and for their classmates.
In order to maintain a consistent self-image, individuals with high
self-esteem were expected to exhibit a greater self-serving bias for
both verifiable (intelligence test) and nonverifiable (morals test)
dimensions than were low self-esteem subjects. In support of the
self-consistency model and self-enhancement theory, it was predicted
that those with high self-esteem receiving information contrary to
their self-concept (failure feedback), would be most likely to
exaggerate the expected differences between themselves and others in
order to reestablish their self-perception. Individuals with high
self-esteem receiving success feedback were also expected to show a
self-serving bias but not to the extent predicted for high self-esteem
subjects presented with failure feedback.
As predicted by the self-consistency and verifiability models, those
with low self-esteem were not expected to exhibit a self-serving bias
in the verifiable (intelligence test) dimension. It was unclear whether
low self-esteem subjects would show self-enhancement in the
nonverifiable (morals test) situation, as predicted by the verifiability
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model, or if they would maintain a negative self-view, as predicted by
the self-consistency model. Low self-esteem subjects receiving
failure feedback consistent with their self-image were expected to
predict similar low test results for themselves and others due to their
general pessimistic view. It was it was also unclear whether
individuals with low self-esteem receiving success feedback would be
able to recognize this positive achievement and predict success for
themselves, as predicted by depressive realism theory, or if they would
derogate the differences between predicted outcomes for themselves
and others in order to maintain their self-view, as predicted by
self-consistency theory. If any self-enhancement by low self-esteem
individuals was to be seen, it was expected from those receiving
success feedback in the nonverifiable (morals test} dimension.
Method
Subjects
The subjects were 36 high (12 male and 24 female} and 41 low (9
male and 32 female} self-esteem psychology students from the
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University of Richmond who participated to fulfill their course
requirement.1
Design
This study employed a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design, with subjects'
self-esteem (high or low), test feedback (success or failure), and test
dimension (intelligence or morals) as between-subjects factors.
Materials
Subjects self-esteem was assessed with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Inventory (Rosenberg, 1965). This latter scale is a well-validated
private, global evaluation of the self. The inventory contains 1Oitems
on which the subjects rate their level of agreement on a 4 point scale.
Reported test-retest reliabilities are greater than .80 (Wylie, 1979).
Possible scores on the Rosenberg inventory range from 1Oto 40.
Subjects in the intelligence test condition were administered one of
the analytic sections from a practice book for the Graduate Record
Exam (Brownstein, Weiner, Green, & Hilbert, 1990). See Appendix A for
a copy of this test. subjects in the morals test condition were given
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20 moral dilemmas from the game Scruples (Milton Bradley Company,

1987). See Appendix B for a copy of these questions.
Procedure
During the first week of their Introductory Psychology course at the
University of Richmond, students completed a demographics
questionnaire and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory (Rosenberg,

1965). Students were designated as either high or low self-esteem via
a median split. Due to the homogeneity and affluence of the student
population, it was not surprising to find 74°/o of the original subject
pool above 30 on this self-esteem scale. The final high and low
self-esteem groups thus consisted of scores ranging from 36 to 40 and

17 to 33 respectively. It must be noted, however, that of the 41
subjects in the low self-esteem group, 3 were below 21 and the rest
ranged from 24 to 33. Within the next 2 to 3 weeks students were
solicited based on their test scores.
To establish a relationship made between low self-esteem and
depression, subjects were first administered the Beck Depression
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Inventory (801) (Beck, 1967). The 801 is a well validated measure of
enduring depressive symptoms (Hammen, 1980) .
One half of the subjects were then given the intelligence test,
whereas the other half were given the morals test. Following the test
subjects were given an unrelated filler task while waiting for their
results. Half of the high and half of the low self-esteem subjects
randomly received positive feedback (93% correct for intelligence
measure or 93% achievement of moral development for adults) and the
other half received negative feedback (48% correct for intelligence
measure or 48% achievement of moral development for adults).
Importance of confidentiality was stressed. To prevent leakage, the
feedback was distributed in envelopes and subjects were instructed not
to discuss it with each other. Subjects were told that this study
represented an effort to establish norms for a test currently used in
many universities for consideration for adoption at the present
university.
Upon receipt of the results, students completed a short
questionnaire in which they were asked how well they believed they
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would perform next semester on the same test, and how well the
average student at the University of Richmond would perform. As a
manipulation check, subjects were asked to indicate how well they
believed they performed on the test.
To reduce any possible negative side effects associated with
participating in this study, subjects were debriefed immediately
concerning the nature and purpose of the deception. We also probed for
subjects' suspiciousness of the true intent of the study.
Results
Manipulation Check
As a manipulation check, subjects were asked, "How well do you
believe you performed on this test?" Subjects were asked to provide a
number from

o to 100.

These data were analyzed using a one-way

analysis of variance (ANOVA). A significant difference between the
two feedback groups was found, F (1, 75) = 61.31, Q. < .00001. Results
indicate that subjects receiving success feedback believed they had
performed better (M = 83.57) than subjects receiving failure feedback
(M = 54.25).
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Belatjonshjp Between Self-Esteem and Depressjon
A Pearson-product moment correlation was computed to determine
the relationship between the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory and the
Beck Depression Inventory. The correlation was found to be
statistically significant (B =-.54, J2<.01 ), indicating that the lower the
subjects' self-esteem, the greater their level of depression. This
result suggests that self-esteem may be an enduring quality within
individuals rather than a temporary or situation specific mood state.
Subjects Performance Predictions
To determine how well subjects believed they would perform on a
future morals or intelligence test compared to others, we computed a 2
(Self-Esteem: high, low) X 2 (Dimension: intelligence, morality) X 2
(Feedback: success, failure) X 2 (Target: self, other) ANOVA with
repeated measures on the last factor. The results revealed several
statistically significant effects.
First, a main effect for feedback was found, E (1, 69) = 84. 78,
P,<.00001. Subjects receiving success feedback had overall higher
predictions (M = 84.51) than subjects receiving failure feedback (M =
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58.21 ). While this finding is not relevant to our central hypotheses, it
validates the credibility of the feedback. A main effect was also found
for target, F (1, 69) = 11.54, 12..< .01. Overall subjects predicted better
success for themselves (M = 73.80) than for their classmates (M =
68.92). This result illustrates people's self-serving tendency to
believe that they are better than others.

------------------------------------------------------------------ -.... --- -.. ---··· .. -. -

--~

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

----------------------------------------------------------------·· ---...... --- -------· ·- -Two significant interactions were also obtained. First, there was an
interaction between self-esteem and target, E (1, 69) = 4.95, Q < .03.
The means associated with this interaction are displayed in Table 1.
As this table shows, the self-serving bias reported above was
operating for subjects with high self-esteem but not for subjects with
low self-esteem. A simple effects test corroborates this
interpretation. Subjects with high self-esteem indicated that they
would perform significantly better on a future test (M = 77.01) than
would others (M

= 68.93), F (1, 69)) = 15.14, p < .001.

In contrast,

The Effects of Self-Esteem
22
subjects with low self-esteem indicated that they would perform
roughly the same on a future test (M = 70.59) as would others (M =
68.91 ), F <1. This finding supports our hypothesis that self-serving
biases are moderated by levels of self-esteem.

---------------------------------------------------------------- ---- -- .-· ...... ·-. -- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

----------------------------------------------------------------- -- -. ·- -- .........
~

--

Second, there was a dimension by target interaction F (1, 69) = 4.56,

g, < .04. The means associated with this interaction are displayed in
Table 2. As predicted by the verifiability model, subjects were more
likely to show a self-serving bias for the nonverifiable dimension,
morality, than for the verifiable dimension, intelligence. This
interpretation is further supported by a test of simple effects.
Subjects who took the morals test predicted that they would perform
significantly better on a future test (M

= 77.30) than would others (M =

69.35), E (1, 69) = 16.70, Q < .0001. However, subjects who took the
intelligence test predicted that on future tests they would do about the
same (M

= 70.30) as would others (M..= 68.49), F < 1.

This finding
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supports the hypothesis that the self-serving bias is further moderated
by the verifiability of the task dimension.
----------------------------------------------------------------- ""' - - - - - - • - .. *' - .. -

INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

-

---------------------------------------------------------------- ---- .-.. -. --- -

~

Two three-way interactions were found to be marginally significant.
First, there was a three-way interaction between self-esteem,
dimension, and target, F (1, 69) = 3.47, Q < .07. The means associated
with this interaction are displayed in Table 3. This effect indicates
that subjects with high self-esteem showed a large self-serving bias
regardless of dimension. However, subjects with low self-esteem
showed a significant self-serving bias for the moral dimension but not
for the intelligence dimension. This finding suggests that although
subjects with low self-esteem are sensitive to the verifiability of a
behavioral dimension, subjects with high self-esteem are not.

----------------------------------------------------------------· -·- ----.---.. -. .INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

--------------------------------------------------------------·- --- ------.. -- ... -
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Finally, there was a marginal three-way interaction between
self-esteem, feedback, and target, F (1, 69) = 2.99, Q. < .09. The means
associated with this interaction are displayed in Table 4. Subjects
with high self-esteem showed a self-serving bias regardless of
feedback, i.e., both success and failure feedback engendered
self-enhancing tendencies. However, the trend suggests that low
self-esteem individuals receiving success feedback tended to
self-enhance, whereas low self-esteem individuals receiving failure
feedback showed no tendency to self-enhance. This again offers
tentative support for depression realism.
Discussion
The theory underlying the present research states that while all
individuals may need to feel good about themselves through
self-enhancement (Brown et al., 1988), only individuals with high
self-esteem are equipped with the mechanism to do so directly.
Individuals with low self-esteem, on the other hand, show depressive
realism in that they are as negative about themselves as they are about
others (Alloy et al., 1987). The ability to self-enhance was proposed to
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be further modulated by the verifiability of the task being described
(Allison et al., 1989). It was therefore predicted that individuals with
high self-esteem would show a greater self-serving bias than
individuals with low self-esteem. Additionally, a greater self-serving
bias was expected when the task was low in verifiability, as in the
morals test, and thus less susceptible to being disproven than a task
high in verifiability such as the intelligence test.
We were also interested in the pattern of subjects' predictions in
response to success or failure feedback. Based on self-consistency
theory (Swann et al. 1987), it was expected that subjects would
predict scores for themselves and others that were consistent with the
way they viewed themselves. Subjects receiving information contrary
to their self-image (success feedback for low self-esteem and failure
feedback for high self-esteem) would then need to predict scores for
themselves and others that would reestablish a consistent view. Thus
low self-esteem subjects make lower predictions for themselves
compared to others, and high self-esteem subjects would show a
reverse pattern, namely, a self-serving bias. Subjects receiving
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information consistent with their self-concept, thereby verifying their
self-esteem were not expected to have much of a discrepancy in their
self-other predictions.
Overall, the data substantiated several of these predictions. For
subjects' with high self-esteem, the findings supported a self-serving
bias and the self-consistency model. Moreover, verifiability theory did
not hold for these subjects, as they tended to inflate their predicted
success over their predictions for others regardless of feedback
(success or failure) or task dimension (intelligence or morals),
supporting a self-serving bias. As predicted by the self-consistency
model, they showed a greater self-enhancement upon receiving failure
feedback, thus reasserting or verifying their superior position. It was
of great interest to find that these high self-esteem individuals were
willing to self-enhance in the face of failure even when the task
dimension was verifiable (intelligence test).
Behavior of individuals with low self-esteem appeared to be
governed by depressive realism when the task was verifiable
(intelligence test), but they were able to show a self-serving bias
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when the task was nonverifiable (morals test). In other words, these
individuals may possess motivations to self-enhance but not at the risk
of getting caught (Allison et al., 1989). These low self-esteem
subjects were therefore sensitive to the dimension on which they
· self-enhanced.
Low self-esteem subjects, however, did not have the resource found
in those with high self-esteem (a self-serving bias) when given failure
feedback, but rather, showed a global pessimism (Beck, 1967). This
global pessimism was reflected in their tendency to predict equally
low scores for themselves and for others as described by depressive
realism. In addition, there was a trend for these individuals to
self-enhance when given success feedback, again predicted by
depressive realism.
On a positive note, these low self-esteem subjects did not support
the self-consistency model. That is, they did not predict lower scores
for themselves (self-derogation) upon receiving informatiori contrary
to their self-esteem (success feedback). However, this may be due to
the majority of the low self-esteem group actually being comprised of
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individuals with average self-esteem. Within this group there were
only 3 subjects with self-esteem scores lower than 21. Upon
reviewing data from one subject who was truly low in self-esteem , a
self-derogation was seen in response to success feedback but only for
the intelligence test. Further studies including subjects with a true
range of high, medium and low self-esteem would enable us to test
several of our hypotheses more effectively.
The data also suggest modifications in the self-consistency and
verifiability models. Contrary to the self-consistency model, subjects
with low self-esteem did self-enhance in the morals test condition. At
least two explanations are possible. First, as mentioned above, the
composition of the low self-esteem group was such that it was
comprised of moderate self-esteem individuals. However, since a
significant difference was found for self-enhancement between the
high and low self-esteem groups the results merit more of a
qualitative explanation.
A second reason for self-esteem differences may be that low
self-esteem individuals want to self-enhance but need the security
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that the the low verifiability gives them. It appears that they are not
as willing to risk being caught at self-enhancing as are those with high
self-esteem. This idea is further supported by Brown et al.'s (1988)
finding that low self-esteem subjects would only self-enhance in
groups for which they were vicarious members. Because they were not
direct group members, there was less of a chance of being caught at
self-enhancing. It appears then that both depressive realism with the
verifiability model better explains low self-esteem behavior.
People with high self-esteem, on the other hand, were not sensitive
to the verifiability issue and self-enhanced regardless of test
dimension. It may be that these individuals' need to verify their
self-esteem is so great that they ignore important information in
processing information about the self. This interpretation is
consistent with previous research indicating that individuals in
positive mood state are less likely to process information in a thorough
and systematic fashion than are individuals in a neutral or negative
mood state (Worth & Mackie, 1987).
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This view is further supported by the differential-attributional
style hypothesis (Alloy et al., 1987). According to this hypothesis,
nondepressed individuals weight internal rather than external cues
when making predictions about the self as compared to others.
Depressed individuals, on the other hand, weight internal and external
cues evenly, a perspective consistent with depressive realism. Thus,
high self-esteem subjects may have been sensitive to internal cues
(self-perception) and may have ignored external cues (verifiability of
the task) in order to arrive at a decision that was consistent with their
self-image. In other words, their rose colored glasses may be very
dark . Therefore, the self-consistency model better predicts the
behavior of individuals with high self-esteem.
The findings provided by the two marginally significant three-way
interactions are central to this thesis and are therefore worthy of
some discussion. As mentioned above, the actual difference in
composition between the high and low self-esteem groups were slight
at best, and therefore finding even marginal significance was a
surprise. The fact that these two self-esteem groups did differ in
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their tendency to self-enhance as a function of verifiability (test
dimension) and feedback suggests that further research is merited in
which true high, medium and low self-esteem groups are recruited. It
is possible that our marginally significant effects may be strengthened
with a clearer differentiation between high and low self-esteem
subjects. Specifically, both self-enhancement and self-derogation
might be seen in true low self-esteem subjects as a function of
feedback by task dimension.
Finally, we would like to offer some possible implications of our
data. It seems that individuals with high self-esteem are better able
to use this technique of self-enhancement strategies under any
circumstances. It may be helpful to monitor the self-talk of these
individuals in order to better teach successful cognitive strategies to
depressed individuals. What can they be thinking that makes them
believe they are so wonderful in the face of contrary or threatening
information? Teaching and encouraging low self-esteem individuals to
self-enhance at first in dimensions that are not verifiable such as
morals (Allison et al. 1989), vicarious group membership (Brown et al.,

The Effects of Self-Esteem

32
1988) or interpersonal behaviors (Van Lange, 1990), for example, may
be met with less resistance. Once they are fluent with this task, it
may be easier to move on to the riskier realm of verifiability. Though
it has not been established what came first, self-esteem or
self-enhancement, what is apparently working well for those with high
self-esteem is, "if ya got it, flaunt it".
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Directions: Each question or group of questions is based on a passage or set of conditions. In answering some of the
questions, it may be useful to draw a rough diagram. For each question, select the best answer choice given.
Questions 1-4
Mrs. F. official hostess of New York City, has invited
several wives of delegates to the United Nations for an
infonnal luncheon. She plans to seat her eleven guests
so that each lady will be able to converse with at least
the person directly to her right or left. She bas prepared
the following list.
Mrs. F speaks English only.
Mrs. G speaks English and French.
Mrs. H speaks English and Russian.
Mrs. J speaks Russian only.
Mrs. K speaks English only.
Mrs. L speaks French only.
Mrs. M speaks French and German.
Mrs. N speaks English and German.
Mrs. 0 speaks English and French.
Mrs. P speaks German and Russian.
Mrs. Q speaks French and German.
Mrs. R speaks English only.
1. Which of the following arrangements will meet Mrs.
Fs requirement?
I.
ll.

m.

(A)
(B)
(C)
(0)
(E)

Fa.MPJHKGQNR
FRNLPKHJGMQO
FRGJHOLMQPKN
lonly
llonly·
filonly
I and ll only
I and ill only

2. If the ladies seated to the rigti of Mrs. P are respecti\'Cly MGHKFO, who must sit at Mrs. P's left
hand?
(A) J
(B) L
(C), N
(D) Q
(E) R

3. If Se¥m of the ladies baYe seaJed tbemsches in the
. _foUowing order. NGFR<MQ, who must be the next
lady seared?
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)

H

J
K
L
p

4. Mrs. F has decided upon the following seating
arrangement:
RKGQNFOLMPJH
At the last minute, Mrs. H and Mrs. P inform the
hostess that they will not be able to attend. Wbic.h of
the following adjustments will allow Mrs. Fs seating requirements to be met?
I.
ll.
ill.

Seat Mts. J between Mrs. K and Mrs. G
Seat Mrs. J betw=n Mrs. Q and Mrs. F
Seat Mrs. J to the right of Mrs. N

(A) lonly
(B) illonly
(C) I II only
(D)
only

or
norm

(E) Neither 1,n, not m

S. Senator Johnson: No argument for this bill is valid,
because no one would argue for this bill without
having an ulterior mo<iYC: namely, the desire for personal gain.
The bill's sponsors would be committing the same
CITOI' in reasoning as Senator Johnson if they
responded by saying:
(A) Of course we haYC ulterior motiYCS. It is perfectly reasonable to support ·a bill in order to
promote our personal interests.
(B) The fact that passing a bill would benefit its
sponsors does not mean that the bill should
not be passed.
(C) The fact that Senator Johnson has substituted a
personal attack for a discu$sion of the merits
of the bill leads us tQ suspect that he can offer
no strong arguments against it.
(D) Senator Johnson has no valid reason for opposing our bill; he is only doing so because we
helped defeat his pork-barrelling bill last

month.
(E) Ever)'ooc is always motivated in part by a desire

for pc:rsonal gain; Senator Johmoo _is ~
exception.

The Effects of
6; Father: My daughter could be a star on Broadway if
she could only get one big break. Why, you should
see the rave reviews she received when she was the
lead in her high school play.
The best way to counter the argument above would
be to point out that
(A) big breaks are hard to come by on Broadway
(B) one big break does not ensure continued success
in the theatre
(C) the standards on Broadway arc much higher
than they are at the high school .le\icJ
(D) fewer plays are being produced on Broadway
today than in the past
(E) relatively few aspiring actors ever become
Broadway stars

Self-Este~

8. If Dan can visit the museum only after S p.m.oroo
Saturday, and docs not wish to view more than one
special exhibition in a day, be can sec all three snecial exhibitions in the briefest time by starting ~
(A) 1bc Hudson Riw:r School" on a 1'lllnday
(B) the Ryder RdrospcctiYe OD a Slbnday
(C) "Precurscn of Eakins" «the~ Retrospec-

ti\'C 0n a 1besday
(D) "PrccunonofW01fa~
(E) my edllbidoa on a SllDlday

9. Ellen wishes to visit the three special~ Oil
succ:esm-e llmsdays. 'Ibis ii only possible if slle
visits
I. the Ryder Reuospective in April
1be Hodson RM:r Sdmol" second .
m. "Prec:unm of F.atins.. imrDecti*'Y following
the Ryder Rdrospccti'IC

n.

7. Most persons who oppose gun control arc cooscnatives; therefore, since Kathleen fawn gun control,
she is probably not a conscrvati\'C.
The above argument most resembles which of the
following?
(A) Most sociology professors arc liberals; thcrcforc
Dr. Williams, who is a liberal, is probably a

(A) Ionly
(B) Ilonly
(C) I and Il only
CD> n and m only
CE> 1. and

n.

m

. sociology professor.
(B) Most corporation presidents own a countty
home; if Ms. Steeples is a corporation president, she may or may not ha't'C a country
home.
(C) Few major publishing finns publish much

poetry; since Flame Press publishes only
poetry, it is probably not a major publishing
finn.
(0) Most sports cars are extremely expensive; since
the new \btus Leopard is not a sports ~ it
is probably inexpensive.
(E) Most desert plants are cacti; therefore the
cholla, a desert plant, is probably a cactus.
Questions 8-11

The Homer Museum of American Art is open daily
except Monday from 11 a.m. to S p.m. Tuesdays and
Thursdays the museum remains open until 8 p.m. The
spring special exhibitions are: ..Albert Pinkham Ryder,
ARetrospective," which is on view from Friday, April
24, through Sunday, May 31, in the Pollock Wing; ..Precursors of Thomas Eakins," from Friday. May 8,
through Sunday, July 6, in the Tbiid Floor Gallery; and
"The Hudson River School," in the John Twachtman
Gallery, which is closed Tuesdays, from Friday, May 1,
through Sunday\ May 24 only. The Pollock wing is
closed Thursdays during May.

10. Ralph can visit all three special exhibitions on one
day if he goes Oil

I. any Saturday in May
the second, third, or fourth Saturday in May
m. any Tuesday or Friday between May s and May

n.

22

(A) lonly
(B) Ilonly
(C) Wonly

(D) I and m only
(E) and
only

n

m

11. 1my visits the "''SCUID on an afternoon six days
after the opening of "'Ibc Hudson River School."
Which of the special exbibitioas may be visit?

I. The Ryder Rdrospec:ti~

n.
m.

..Precunon of Eakim"

.
"'Ibc Humoa Riw:r School"

(A) looly

CB> mon1y

(C) I and II only
(D) D and m only
(E) I, II, and m
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Questions 12-18
At a symposium on the possible dangers of the industrial
chemical PBX, du= pro-industry spokespersons are to
be seated to the left of the moderator and three critics of
PBX to the right of the modemor•.The speakers are Ors.
Albert, Burris, Cathode, Durand, Ettis, and Felsenstein.
(1) The person delivering the paper "Epidemiological
Aspects of PBX" is seated immediately

between Dr. Albert and Dr. Durand.
(2) The persons delivering "Public Health and PBX"
and '"Radiological Aspects of PBX" are close
friends and insist on sitting together.
(3) Felsenstein is placed two seats to the left of the
moderator.
(4} As heavy smoking is repugnant to the moderator,
she insists that the person delivering "PBX:
Benign or Malignant," a heavy smoker, be
seated at one end of the table.
(S) Cathode, delivering "The Impact of PBX on the
Environment," is seated to the left of
Felsenstein.
(6) Albert, a critic of PBX, is seated to the left of
Ettis.
12. The pro-industry spokespersons are
(A) Albert, Felsinstcin, Durand
(B) Felsenstein, Burris, Albert
(C) Cathode, Felsenstein, Ettis
(D) Albert, Burris, Durand
(E} Cathode, Felsenstcin, Burris
13. The person seated immediately to the left of the
moderator is
(A) Albert
(B) Burris
(C) Cathode
(D) Durand
(E) Ettis

14. Assuming it is one of the papers delivm:d at the
symposium, "PBX and the Digesti\'e 1iact" must be
by

Albert
Burris
Durand
Ettis
(E) Felseostein
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

lS.

WbiCb of the following cannot be detaminc:d on the
blSis of the informalioo given?

I. The author of ..Public Health and PBX"
II. The title of the paper delivered by Durand
m. 1be identity of the two friends who insist on
being together
(A) looly
(B) lonly
<C> moo1y

(D) I and II only

<E> n and monly

16. Given the seating rules as stated, which of the numbered statements are logically sufficient· to establish
the position of Dr. Enis and the tide of the paper she
deli\'Cl'S?
(A) 1, 3, 4
(B) I, 2, 3,.4
(C) I, 3, S, 6

(D) I, 4, 5, 6
(E) 1, 3, 4, 5
17. The symposium is expanded to include a seventh
speaker. If be is seated exactly midway between
Cathode and the moderator, he will sit

(A) to the left of the author of ''Radiological
Aspects of PBX"
(B) one scat to the right of the moderator
(C) two seats to the right of Durand
(D) three sears. to the left of Albert
(E) four scats to the left of the author of "PBX:
Benign or Malignant"
18. The symposium is further expanded to include an
eighth speaker. If she is seared exactly midway
between Durand and the author of "Public Health
and PBX," which of the following must be true?
°(A) The eighth speaker must be seated to the righl
of the moderator.
(B) Burris must be the author of "Radiological
Aspects of PBX."
(C) The eighth speaker must be seated on the same
side of the moderator as Felsenstein.
(D) The moderator must be seated next to the author
of "Public Health and PBX ...
(E) The eighth speaker must be 5eated immediately
to the left of Ettis.

Questions 19-22
A is the father of two children. B and D, who arc of different sexes.
C is B's spouse
E is the same sex as D.
Band C have two children: F, who is the same sex as B,
and G, who is the same sex as C.
E's mother, H, who is married to L, is the sister of D's
motber, M.
E and E's spouse, I. have two children, J and K, who
are the same sex as I.
No persons have married more than once and no children have been born out of wc:dlock. The only restrictions on maniage are that marriage to a sibling, to a
· direct descendant. or tO more than one person at the
same time are forbidden.

19. Fis
(A) G's brother

(B) G's sister
(C) B's daughter
(D) D's niece or ncpbcw
(E} the same sex as H
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20. According to the rules, D can marry
(A) -Fonly
(B) G only

(C) ] only
(D). J or K only
(E) F, J, or K

21. IfL and H divorced, H could marry
I.
II

m.

Dooly
F
Doro

(A) lonly
(B) Ilonly
(C) illonly
(D) I or Il, but not both
(E) n or m, but not both

22. If the gcoc:ration of F and K's parents and their siblings contains more females than males, which of the
following must be true?
(A) There arc more females than males in F and K's
~
(8) ] is male.
(C) A is the same sex as D
(D) K and G arc the same sex.
(E) Dis H's nephew.

Questions 23-25
The internal combustion engine, which powers all private motorized vehicles, should be banned. It bums up
petroleum products that arc needed to produce plastics,
synthetics, and many medicines. Once all the oil is
gone, we will no longer be able to produce these valuable commodities. Yet we do not have to bum gasoline to
satisfy our transportation needs. Other kinds of engines
could be developed if the oil companies would stop
I blocking research efforts.

23. The argument above depends OD which of the following assumptions?
I. We arc in imminent danger of running out
of oil.
n. Altt:mad~ methods of producing plastica wiD
not be found befln the oil nins out•.
m. If they so desiml, the oil c:0mpames c:oUl6
deYeJop methods of trusporation not bwd OD
the bumiag of pctroleum.
(A) I~
(B) Iloaly
(C) Jami u only

<D>

nand mon1y

(E) I, II and ill

24. 1be argument above would be most wealrcned by the
deYelopment of which of the following?
(A) An internal combusdm engine that operated on

(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)

one-tenth the gasoline used in a normal
engine
A car that opcrared on solar energy stored in
special batteries ·
A method of producing plastic that used no
petroleum products
A synthetic oil with all the properties of natural
oil
A means of locating numerous undisc~ oil
fields

25. The argument above would be most strengthened if
which of the following were true?

(A) One of the oil companies has suppressed the

discovery of an engine that bums only
. alcohol.
(B) Some oftbc mcdiCines that require petroleum

for their production help to control and cure
several of the world's most deadly diseases.
(C) The world's cunent oil reserves are about half
of what they wac 30 years ago.
(0) In high pollution areas, automobile exhaust
fumes have been shown to cause high rates of
lung cancer and heart disease.
(E) When gasoline~ burned inside an auto engine·~
less than one-fourth of the energy produced ii
used to propel the \'dllclc.
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Appendix B
Please read each problem over carefully and consider what you
would do. In the space provided, indicate what you would do in
the given situation and more importantly explain why/how you
have reached this conclusion.

1. You're on a first date with someone special at a very elegant
restaurant with very intimidating waiters. Your filet mignon
arrives overdone. Do you send it back to the kitchen?

2. You work at a restaurant that serves rolls with every meal.
Often the rolls are returned to the kitchen seemingly untouched.
Would you serve them again?

3. You have to go to court on a drunk driving charge. Do you tell
your boss the truth about why you need to take the time off from
work?

4. You discover that you were invited to your cousin's wedding
only because other guests canceled out•. Do you still go?
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5. You're driving at night. The car behind you is blinding you
with its high beams. Finally, the car passes you and is now
ahead of you. Do you turn your high beams on?

6. Trying to impress your newest date, you tell him/her that
you're an expert skier when you're really only a beginner. He/She
surprises you with a ski weekend at a new resort. Do you tell
him/her you "snowed" him/her before you leave on the trip?

7. Your father is having an affair. Your mother is unaware of it.
Do you tell her?

8. A friend, whom you're very competitive with, signs up for an
outdoor survival program-the challenge is to spend three days
and nights alone in the woods. Your friend dares you to test your
resources in the same program. Would you?
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9. You've always been attracted to your best friend's
boy/girlfriend. They just broke up! Would you ask your best
friend's ex out on a date?

10. Friends loan you a few movies for you VCR. One mislabeled
tape shows your friends frolicking nude on a beach. Do you
watch the rest of the "vacation" tape?

11. A radio talk show host you've been listening to for years
makes an insulting remark about people of your ethnic heritage
on the air. Do you call the radio station to complain?

12. You and your boy/girlfriend have an intense sexual
relationship. Your lover calls at work requesting a brief
romantic interlude at a friend's nearby apartment. You must
make up an excuse and leave work to keep the rendezvous. Do
you?·
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13. An overweight friend complains about the poor workmanship
of clothes because seams often pull out and zippers always
break. Do you suggest that losing weight might help?

14. Your current boy/girlfriend asks you how many
boy/girlfriends you've had in the past. Do you tell the truth?

15. You're in a busy shoe store and are anxious to be served. The
sales clerk begins to wait on you before another customer who
was there longer. Do you refer the clerk to the other customer?

16. You're seated in a non-smoking section of an airplane. Two
seats away in the same non-smoking section, a passenger lights
up. Do you ask the smoker to put out the cigarette?
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17. From your living room window, you see two members of a
particular religious sect walking towards your door. The group
is dedicated to making converts. Do you pretend you are not
home?

18. An artist friend gives you one of her framed paintings as a
gift. You're not wild about the piece, but she frequently stops by
your dorm room for a visit. Do you hang it?

19. You have just earned a degree in biology. Your best job offer
comes from a laboratory that does experiments on live animals.
Do you accept the job?

20. Passing a playground you witness two young children having
a vicious fight. Do you intervene?
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Footnotes
1Qf the 77 students, 2 were African-American, 2 were
Asian-American and the remaining 73 were Caucasian. Of those
responding, 45 considered themselves Protestant, 22 Catholic, 2
Agnostic, 2 "none" and 1 Jewish. Forty-eight considered themselves
upper-middle class, 25 middle class and 2 lower-middle class.
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Table 1
Mean Performance Predictions as a Function of Self-Esteem and Target

Target

Self-Esteem

High

Low

Other

Self

77.01

68.93

(20.47)

(19.57)

70.59

68.91

(20.06)

(17.04)

NQm. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2·
Mean Performance Predictions as a Function of
Test Pimension and Taraet

Target
Dimension

Intelligence

Self

Other

70.30
(22.48)

Morals

77.30
(18.34)

N.Qm. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.

68.49
(21.02)

69.35
(15.49)
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Table 3
Mean Performance Predictions as a Function of Test Dimension.
Self-Esteem and Target
Target
Dimension

Other

Self

High Self-Esteem
Intelligence

74.08
(24.43}

Morals

66.39
(24.77}

79.94
(17.49}

71.47
(15.34}

Low Self-Esteem
Intelligence

66.53

70.59

(20.78}
Morals

(18.46}

74.66
(19.09}

67.23
(15.68)

NQm. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.

